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This paper investigates a Trejos-Wright random matching model of
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1 Introduction
Trejos and Wright (1995) show the existence of a monetary steady state
in a random matching model under the assumption that an agent’s money
holding is in {0, 1}. In the same model, for consumer take-it-or-leave-it
offers and for money holdings in {0, 1, · · · , B}, Zhu (2003) provides sufficient
conditions for the existence of a full-support monetary steady state with a
strictly increasing and strictly concave value function. By way of a variant of
a neutrality argument, his result also implies the existence of non-full-support
steady states in which all agents treat bundles of money, each bundle being
B/l ∈ N units, as the smallest unit held and traded.
Among the questions that Zhu’s existence result leaves open are the fol-
lowing. First, are his full-support steady states unique? Second, do both
pure-strategy and mixed-strategy steady states exist generically?1 Third,
are full-support steady states stable? Fourth, are the above non-full-support
steady states stable? The smallest set of money holdings for which these
questions arise is {0, 1, 2}, which is the smallest set for which the distribu-
tion of money holdings over people depends on the trades that are made. For
this set, we answer all but the first question.
Under a condition that is weaker than Zhu’s sufficient conditions, a full-
support steady state exists. Both pure-strategy and mixed-strategy full-
support steady states exist generically. As regards stability, any full-support
steady state is stable, while the nonfull-support steady state, which necessar-
ily has support {0, 2}, is unstable. Although the two-unit bound is restrictive,
it, at least, permits conjectures to be made for the general case.
One reason to study the Zhu (2003) model is that it has policy implica-
tions that differ from those of the model with money holdings in {0,1} and
from models with degenerate distributions of money holdings. In particular,
as shown by Molico (2006), moderate inflation improves welfare through re-
distributional effects in versions of the Zhu model. That cannot happen in
models with money holdings in {0,1} or in models with degenerate distri-
butions of money holdings. But prior studies of Zhu’s model leave open the
questions set out above, some of which are addressed here.
1Zhu uses a fixed-point theorem for the existence proof so the equilibrium strategy is
not described.
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2 The Zhu (2003) model
Time is discrete, with periods dated as t ≥ 0. There is a unit measure of
non-atomic agents who are infinitely-lived. Also, there are divisible and non-
storable consumption goods at each date. Each agent maximizes expected
discounted utility with discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). At each date, if an agent
produces an amount q ≥ 0 of the good, the utility cost is q. If an agent
consumes an amount q ≥ 0 of the good, the period utility he gets is u(q),
where u : R+ → R is strictly increasing, strictly concave and continuously
differentiable on R+. Also, u(0) = 0, u′(∞) = 0 and u′(0) is sufficiently large
but finite.2 These assumptions imply that there is a unique x¯ > 0 such that
u(x¯) = x¯.
There exists a fixed stock of indivisible money that is perfectly durable.
There is a bound on individual money holdings, denoted B ∈ N, so the
individual money-holding set is B ≡ {0, 1, · · · , B}. Let m ∈ (0, 1) denote
the per capita stock of money divided by the bound on individual money
holdings so that the per capita stock is Bm.
It is assumed that agents cannot consume their own production goods
so they need to trade to obtain consumption. In each period, agents are
randomly matched in pairs. With probability 1/n, where n ≥ 2, an agent
is a consumer (producer) and the partner is a producer (consumer). Such
meetings are called single-coincidence meetings. With probability 1 − 2/n,
the match is a no-coincidence meeting.3 In meetings, agents’ money holdings
are observable, but any other information about an agent’s trading history
is private.
Consider a date-t single-coincidence meeting between a consumer (poten-
tial buyer) with i units of money (pre-trade) and a producer (potential seller)
with j units of money (pre-trade), an (i, j)-meeting. If i > 0 and j < B, the
meeting is called a trade meeting. In trade meetings, the consumer makes
a take-it-or-leave-it offer. (There are no lotteries.) The producer accepts or
rejects the offer. If the producer rejects it, both sides leave the meeting and
go on to the next date.
For each k ∈ B, let wtk be the expected discounted value of holding k units
of money prior to date-t matching. Using the wtk’s, the consumer’s problem
2The assumption u′(0) <∞ is used only in the proof of proposition 5.
3If n ≥ 3, one foundation is that there are n types of agents and n types of consumption
goods, that type-k agents can produce type-k goods only and consume type-(k+ 1) goods
only, and that the money is symmetrically distributed across the types.
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in an (i, j)-meeting is
max
p∈Γ(i,j),q∈R+
{u(q) + βwt+1i−p} (1)
s.t. − q + βwt+1j+p ≥ βwt+1j , (2)
where Γ(i, j) ≡ {p ∈ B|p ≤ min{i, B − j}} is the set of feasible payments.
As (2) holds with equality in the solution, the consumer’s problem reduces
to
f t(i, j) ≡ max
p∈Γ(i,j)
{u (βwt+1j+p − βwt+1j )+ βwt+1i−p}.
We define
P t(i, j) ≡ argmax
p∈Γ(i,j)
{u (βwt+1j+p − βwt+1j )+ βwt+1i−p}. (3)
Because the solution P t(i, j) may be multi-valued, Zhu introduces random-
ization. Let Λt(i, j) denote the set of probability distributions on P t(i, j). A
mapping λt is called a consumer’s optimal strategy if it maps each (i, j) ∈
B× B to an element of Λt(i, j), so that∑
p∈P t(i,j)
λt(p; i, j) = 1. (4)
For each z ∈ B, let pitz denote the fraction of agents holding z units of
money at the start of period t, so that pit is a probability distribution on B
with mean Bm. Given a strategy, the law of motion for pit+1 can be expressed
as
pit+1z =
n− 2
n
pitz +
2
n
B∑
i=0
B∑
j=0
pitipi
t
j
λt(i− z; i, j) + λt(z − j; i, j)
2
. (5)
The second term of (5) informs who in single-coincidence meetings will end
up with z units: consumers who originally had i units and spent i− z units
and producers who originally had j units and acquired z − j units.
The value function wt satisfies the Bellman equation
wti =
n− 1
n
βwt+1i +
1
n
B∑
j=0
pitjf
t(i, j). (6)
The first term of the r.h.s corresponds to either entering a no-coincidence
meeting or becoming a producer, who is indifferent between trading and not
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trading. When i = 0, equation (6) reduces to wt0 = βw
t+1
0 , so the only nonex-
plosive case is wt0 = 0,∀t. For this reason, we focus on equilibria in which the
value from owning no money is always zero and let wt ≡ (wt1, · · · , wtB). Fi-
nally, we allow free disposal of money and consider equilibria in which agents
are not willing to throw away money. That is, the value function must be
nondecreasing in every period:
wtB ≥ · · · ≥ wt1 ≥ wt0 = 0. (7)
Definition 1 Given pi0, an equilibrium is a sequence {(pit, wt)}∞t=0 that sat-
isfies the consumer’s optimality condition (4), the law of motion (5), the
Bellman equation (6), and non-disposal of money (7). A tuple (pi,w) is a
monetary steady state if (pit, wt) = (pi,w) for t ≥ 0 is an equilibrium and
w 6= 0. Full-support steady states are those for which pi has a full support.
Pure-strategy steady states are those for which (3) has a unique solution for
all meetings. Other steady states are called mixed-strategy steady states.
3 Monetary steady states when B = 2
In Trejos and Wright (1995), the case B = 1, a necessary and sufficient
condition for existence of a monetary steady state is
u′(0) >
n(1− β)
β(1−m) + 1 (≡ K) . (8)
One of our propositions says that (8) is also necessary and sufficient for
existence of a full-support steady state in the economy with B = 2. To
state it, it is helpful to express pi0 and pi2 in terms of pi1 using
∑
pii = 1 and∑
ipii = Bm. We have
(pi0, pi2) =
(
1−m− pi1
2
,m− pi1
2
)
, (9)
pi1 ∈ Π ≡ [0, 2 min{m, 1−m}]. (10)
Throughout this paper, the dependence of pi on pi1 is kept implicit to simplify
the notation.
Lemma 1 If a monetary full-support steady state exists, then
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(i) the solution set (3) is either {1} or {1, 2} for (2,0)-meetings and is {1}
for other trade meetings; and
(ii) pi1 satisfies pi1 ≤ pi∗1 ≡ (
√
1 + 12m(1−m) − 1)/3, where the inquality
is strict if and only if λ(1; 2, 0) < 1.
The proof of this result and all other proofs appear in section 5. The
proof of lemma 1(i) first shows optimality of one-unit payment in any trade
meeting. Using that result, it then shows suboptimality of zero-unit payment
in those meetings.
The next lemma gives a characterization of when full-support steady
states exist and is useful for proving the main existence result.
Lemma 2 A monetary full-support steady state exists if and only if there
exists (pi1, x) 0 such that
x =
δ
1− pi2 [pi0u(x) + pi1u(δx)] ≡ h(x, pi1) (11)
and
u[(1 + δ)x] ≤ u(x) + x, (12)
where
δ =
(1− pi2)β
n(1− β) + (1− pi2)β < 1 (13)
and where (12) must hold with equality if pi1 < pi
∗
1. (Notice that the definition
of h takes into account the dependence of pi and δ on pi1.)
If pi1 = pi
∗
1 and (12) holds strictly, then the steady state is a pure-strategy
steady state, and it is a mixed-strategy steady state otherwise. The necessity
part of the proof uses lemma 1 to derive (11)-(13). The sufficiency part
shows that pi1 > 0 and (βw1, βw2) = (x, (1 + δ)x) satisfy all the equilibrium
conditions.
Proposition 1 u′(0) > K is necessary and sufficient for existence of a mon-
etary full-support steady state.
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Figure 1: Parameter regions for full-support steady states
This figure shows the regions of (m,β) for existence of pure-strategy
full-support steady states (PF) and mixed-strategy full-support steady
states (MF).
The proof uses the following main ideas. For a given pi1 ∈ [0, pi∗1], the
function h(·, pi1) is strictly concave and differentiable on R+, h(0, pi1) = 0,
and h1(∞, pi1) = 0. Therefore, (11) has a positive solution if and only if
h1(0, pi1) > 1.
Proposition 2 Generically, both pure-strategy and mixed-strategy full-support
steady states exist. (That is, there exists open regions in the parameter space
in which pure-strategy full-support steady states exist and open regions in
which mixed-strategy full-support steady states exist.)
It is helpful to have an example of cases where pure-strategy and mixed-
strategy full-support steady states exist. Let n = 2 and u(y) = y1/2. For
such a utility function, (11) can be explicitly solved, and the inequality (12)
for (m,β), although complicated, can be explicitly derived. Figure 1 displays
open regions of (m,β) for which each of the two types of full-support steady
states exist.4 The figure shows that when money is sufficiently scarce buyers
always pay just one unit, whereas when the money supply is high, buyers
sometimes spend two units of money in one trade. The threshold depends
on how much the future matters, namely β.5
We end this section with a lemma about a monetary steady state with a
non-full-support distribution.
Lemma 3 A monetary steady state with support {0, 2} exists if and only if
(8) holds, and it is unique. It has w1 = 0 and w2 that is a unique positive
solution to
w =
n− 1 +m
n
βw +
1−m
n
u(βw). (14)
Moreover, P (1, 0) = {0, 1}, P (1, 1) = P (2, 1) = {1}, and P (2, 0) = {2}.
4Although the full-support steady states computed in figure 1 seem to be unique, we
have been unable to establish such uniqueness in general. Nor do we have an example of
co-existence.
5On the boundary, one-unit payment and two-unit payment are indifferent for buyers
but the former is assigned probability one.
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4 Stability
In this section we study stability of our three kinds of steady states. Our
stability criterion is as follows.
Definition 2 A steady state (pi,w) is locally stable if there is a neighborhood
of pi such that for any initial distribution in the neighborhood, there is an
equilibrium path such that (pit, wt) → (pi,w). A locally stable steady state is
determinate, if for each initial distribution in this neighborhood, there is only
one equilibrium that converges to it.
This definition of stability only requires convergence of some equilibria,
not all equilibria. This is because there are always equilibria that do not
converge to a given monetary steady state. In particular, a non-monetary
equilibrium always exists from any initial condition.
Notice that the above definition of local stability implies that the valued-
money steady state in the Trejos-Wright {0, 1} model is stable, because there
is no ‘neighborhood’ of the steady state. Also, for that model, the only non-
explosive path converging to that steady state is the one in which the value
of money remains constant, which implies determinacy of that steady state.6
The following are our stability results for the {0, 1, 2} economy.
Proposition 3 Mixed-strategy full-support steady states are generically lo-
cally stable.
Proposition 4 Pure-strategy full-support steady states are generically lo-
cally stable and determinate.
Proposition 5 Non-full-support steady states are unstable.
The stability of the mixed-strategy steady state is proved by showing that
if the initial distribution is sufficiently close to the steady state distribution,
then the mixed-strategy steady state can be attained in one step, except in
a nongeneric situation in which P (2, 0) = {1, 2} but λ(1; 2, 0) = 1 so the
distribution is equal to that of the pure-strategy full-support steady state.
The standard approach to stability analysis for difference equation sys-
tems (see, for example, [6]) is to compare the number of eigenvalues of the
6For the Trejos-Wright {0, 1} model, Lomeli and Temzelides (2002) show that the non-
monetary steady state is indeterminate.
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dynamical system that are strictly smaller than one in absolute value, say a,
and the number of initial conditions, say b. If a = b (a > b), then there is a
unique (an infinity of) convergent path(s). If a < b, then there is no conver-
gent solution. This standard approach is applied to establish local stability
and determinacy of the pure-strategy full-support steady state except for a
nongeneric situation in which the Bellman equation is not time-invertible at
the steady state.
The statement about non-full-support steady state shows that if the econ-
omy starts with a positive measure of people holding one unit of money, then
the economy does not converge to the steady state in which a bundle of two
units of money is treated as one in {0, 1} model. The proof is by way of con-
tradiction and relies on two features. First, the dynamical system necessarily
involves unit-root convergence because the outflow from holdings of 1 unit,
which comes from (1, 1)-meetings, approaches zero rapidly as the frequency
of such meetings goes to zero. Second, the non-full-support steady state is
on the boundary of the state space in two senses: the distribution does not
have full support and the value of money is not strictly increasing. Hence, a
convergent sequence must at all dates satisfy pit1 ≥ 0 and (7).
5 Proofs
Before turning to the proofs, we set out some steady state consequences that
we use in the proofs. The steady-state law of motion reduces to
(pi1)
2λ(1; 1, 1) =
(
1−m− pi1
2
)(
m− pi1
2
)
λ(1; 2, 0), (15)
which equates outflows from holdings of 1 (the lefthand side) to inflows into
holdings of 1 (the righthand side). The Bellman equations are
w1 =
n− 1 + pi2
n
βw1 +
pi0
n
max[u(βw1), βw1] (16)
+
pi1
n
max[u(βw2 − βw1), βw1], and
w2 =
n− 1 + pi2
n
βw2 +
pi1
n
max[u(βw2 − βw1) + βw1, βw2]
+
pi0
n
max[u(βw2), u(βw1) + βw1, βw2]. (17)
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As for full-support steady states, lemma 1 establishes that zero-unit pay-
ment is suboptimal and one-unit payment is optimal in all trade meetings in
any full-support steady state, two-unit payment in (2, 0)-meetings being also
optimal for a mixed-strategy full-support steady state. The corresponding
inequalities are
(1, 1)-meeting u(βw2 − βw1) > βw1 (18)
(1, 0)-meeting u(βw1) > βw1 (19)
(2, 1)-meeting u(βw2 − βw1) > βw2 − βw1 (20)
& (2, 0)-meeting u(βw1) + βw1 > βw2 (21)
u(βw1) + βw1 ≥ u(βw2). (22)
The proof of lemma 1 is composed of two steps. Step 1 shows that being
a full-support monetary steady state (i.e., pi1 > 0 and w2 > 0) implies that
both λ(1; 1, 1) and λ(1; 2, 0) are strictly positive and that (18)-(22) hold at
least weakly. Step 2 shows that when (18)-(22) hold weakly, the solution to
(16)-(17) satisfies (18)-(21) strictly.
Proof of lemma 1. (i) Being a monetary steady state implies w2 > 0 and
having a full-support distribution implies pi1 > 0. Then (16) implies w1 > 0.
Step 1 : Any full-support monetary steady state satisfies (18)-(22) at least
weakly.
Proof of Step 1
First we show λ(1; 1, 1) > 0 and that (18), (21) and (22) hold at least weakly.
Suppose by way of contradiciton that λ(1; 1, 1) = 0 so u(βw2 − βw1) ≤
βw1. Then (19) must hold, because substituting (19) with a reversed weak
inequality and the supposition into (16) gives w1 = 0, a contradiction to
w1 > 0. Then the supposition and (19) gives
βw2 − βw1 < βw1. (23)
Note that (19) implies 0 < βw1 < x¯, with x¯ = u(x¯). Thus we have 0 ≤
βw2 − βw1 < x¯, which in turn implies (20) with weak inequality. This
weak inequality and (23) gives (21). Because u is strictly concave, that (18)
does not hold implies u(βw2) − u(βw1) < βw1. This together with (21)
implies λ(1; 2, 0) = 1. For pi1 to be strictly positive in (15), we must have
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λ(1; 1, 1) > 0, a contradiction. Therefore we have λ(1; 1, 1) > 0 and hence
the weak (18). But if λ(1; 1, 1) > 0, then (15) and pi1 > 0 imply λ(1; 2, 0) > 0.
This implies (21) at least weakly and (22).
Next we show that (19) and (20) hold at least weakly. Suppose by way of
contradiction that u(βw1) < βw1. Then the weak (18) implies βw2 − βw1 >
βw1. Combining this with the weak (21) gives u(βw1) > βw1, which is a
contradiction. Suppose now by way of contradiction that (20) does not hold
even weakly: u(βw2 − βw1) < βw2 − βw1. Then the weak (21) implies
βw2 − βw1 < βw1. But the weak (18) and supposition imply βw2 − βw1 >
βw1, which is a contradiction. (End of proof of Step 1)
Step 2 : If (18)-(22) hold weakly, then (18)-(21) hold strictly.
Proof of Step 2
When (18)-(22) hold at least weakly, we can eliminate ‘max’ operators from
(16)-(17). Then subtracting (16) from (17) gives
w2 − w1 = (1− pi2)β
n(1− β) + (1− pi2)βw1, (24)
and βw1 is a solution to
βw1 =
β
n(1− β) + (1− pi2)β
[
pi0u(βw1) + pi1u
(
(1− pi2)β
n(1− β) + (1− pi2)ββw1
)]
,(25)
Suppose by way of contradiction that (18) does not hold:
u(βw2 − βw1) = u
(
(1− pi2)β
n(1− β) + (1− pi2)ββw1
)
≤ βw1.
Then, we have
βw1 ≤ pi0β
n(1− β) + pi0βu(βw1)
< u
(
pi0β
n(1− β) + pi0ββw1
)
< u
(
(1− pi2)β
n(1− β) + (1− pi2)ββw1
)
= u(βw2 − βw1),
where the first inequality is by substituting the supposition into (25) and the
second is by u(0) = 0 and strict concavity of u. This is contradiction and
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thus (18) should hold. Inequality (21) follows from u(βw1) > u(βw2−βw1) >
βw1 > βw2 − βw1, where the first and the third inequalities are by (24) and
the second is (18).
Suppose by way of contradiction that (19) does not hold: u(βw1) ≤ βw1.
Then (18) implies βw2 − βw1 > βw1. Combining this with (21) gives
u(βw1) > βw1, which is a contradiction. Suppose now by way of contradic-
tion that (20) does not hold: u(βw2−βw1) ≤ βw2−βw1. Then (21) implies
βw2−βw1 ≤ βw1. But (18) and supposition imply βw2−βw1 > βw1, which
is a contradiction. In summary, (18)-(21) hold strictly. (End of proof of Step
2)
(ii) Letting λ(1; 1, 1) = 1 and λ(1; 2, 0) = γ in (15) and solving it for pi1
yields
pi1 =
√(
γ
4− γ
)2
+ 4m(1−m) γ
4− γ −
γ
4− γ . (26)
Here pi1 ∈ [0, pi∗1] is strictly increasing in γ ∈ [0, 1] and is equal to pi∗1 iff γ = 1.
Proof of lemma 2. (Necessity) By lemma 1, inequalities (18)-(22) hold for
any full-support steady state. Under these inqualities, the Bellman equations
(16)-(17) become (11) and (13) with x = βw1 and (1+δ)x = βw2. Also, (22)
implies (12).
(Sufficiency) The proof resembles a guess and verify argument. Suppose we
have such (pi1, x). Let βw1 = x and βw2 = (1 + δ)x. Then we have (24)-(25).
The same arguments as step 2 of the proof of lemma 1 show that (18)-(21)
hold. Also, (22) is given by (12), Therefore we have (18)-(22) with equality
in (22) if and only if (12) holds with equality. That is, such (βw1, βw2)
satisfies the optimality of lemma-1 trade. Under the lemma-1 trade, the
Bellman equation (16)-(17) is equivalent to (11) and (13) with x = βw1 and
(1+δ)x = βw2, so the Bellman equation trivially holds. If (12) holds strictly
and hence λ(1; 2, 0) = 1, then pi1 = pi
∗
1 satisfies the law of motion (15).
If (12) holds with equality and hence pi1 < pi
∗
1, then (15) holds with some
unique λ(1; 2, 0) due to lemma 1(ii) That is, all the equilibrium conditions
are satisfied.
The proof of proposition 1 uses the intermediate value theorem to con-
struct (pi1, x) 0 in lemma 2.
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Proof of proposition 1. In this proof, we denote δ as δpi1 to make the
dependence on pi1 explicit. First we show necessity of (8). Suppose that
a full-support steady state exists. By lemma 1, full-support steady states
satisfy (18)-(22). If all these optimality conditions are substituted into (16)
and (17) and (βw2, βw1) is replaced by (x, (1 + δpi1)x), then one obtains
(11). That is, it is necessary for (11) to have a positive solution x, which as
remarked in the text implies h1(0, pi1) > 1, where
h1(0, pi1) = δpi1
[
pi0
1− pi2 +
pi1δpi1
1− pi2
]
u′(0) ≡ Jpi1u′(0). (27)
Therefore, h1(0, pi1) > 1 is equivalent to u
′(0) > 1/Jpi1 . By some algebra, one
can show
1/Jpi1 −K =
n(1− β)
β
· pi1n(1− β) + βpi1pi0
[pi0n(1− β) + β(1− pi2)2](2− 2m) ≥ 0,
with equality if and only if pi1 = 0. Therefore (8) is necessary for (11) to
have a positive x > 0.
Next we show sufficiency of (8). Let x0 be the unique positive solution for
x to x = h(x, 0). A consequence is h1(x0, 0) < 1. Because h(x, 0) = δ0u(x),
where δ0 denotes δ when pi1 = 0, we have δ0u
′(x0) < 1. Applying the
concavity theorem, we have
u[(1 + δ0)x0]− u(x0) < u′(x0)δ0x0 < x0. (28)
Now, consider the function h1(0, pi1) on the domain [0, pi
∗
1]. By (13) and (27),
h1(0, pi1) is continuous. We also know that h1(0, 0) = δ0u
′(0) = u′(0)/K > 1.
Now, there are two cases.
Case 1: There exists p¯i1 ∈ (0, pi∗1) such that h1(0, p¯i1) = 1 and h1(0, pi1) > 1
for all pi1 ∈ (0, p¯i1) (That is, (11) has a potive solution x > 0 for all pi1 ∈
(0, p¯i1).) Let xpi1 be the unique positive solution to x = h(x, pi1) for each
pi1 ∈ (0, p¯i1). Note first that because δpi1 is decreasing in n and is equal to
one when n = 0, the expression in the square brackets in (27) is smaller than
one. Therefore, (27) for pi1 = p¯i1 implies 1 = h1(0, p¯i1) < δp¯i1u
′(0). Thus
u(xpi1) + xpi1 − u((1 + δpi1)xpi1)
xpi1
<
xpi1 − u′((1 + δpi1)xpi1)δpi1xpi1
xpi1
→ 1− u′(0)δp¯i1 < 0, as pi1 → p¯i1, (29)
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where the first inequality follows from concavity of u and the limit operation
uses the fact that xpi1 → 0 as pi1 → p¯i1. Therefore we have u(xpi1) + xpi1 <
u((1 + δpi1)xpi1) for pi1 < p¯i1 that is sufficiently close to p¯i1. Recalling (28), we
can apply the intermediate value theorem, so there exists pˆi1 such that
u(xpˆi1) + xpˆi1 = u((1 + δpˆi1)xpˆi1). (30)
By lemma 2, such a pair (pˆi1, xpˆi1) forms a mixed-strategy full-support steady
state.
Case 2: h1(0, pi1) > 1 for all pi1 ∈ [0, pi∗1]. In this case, (11) has a positive
solution for all pi1 ∈ [0, pi∗1]. If u(xpi∗1 ) + xpi∗1 ≤ u((1 + δpi∗1 )xpi∗1 ), then with
(28) the intermediate value theorem is applied and we have (30) for some pˆi1.
By lemma 2, the pair (pˆi1, xpˆi1) forms a mixed-strategy full-support steady
state. If u(xpi∗1 ) + xpi∗1 > u((1 + δpi∗1 )xpi∗1 ), then lemma 2 implies that there is
a (pure-strategy) full-support steady state. Lemma 1 and 2 imply that it is
a unique pure-strategy full-support steady state.
Overall, a mixed-strategy steady state exists when a pure-strategy steady
state does not.
Proof of Proposition 2. When β is sufficiently close to one, the pure-
strategy full-support steady state exists. To see this, fix all parameters except
β and let pi1 = pi
∗
1. As β → 1, equation (11) approaches xpi∗1 = u(xpi∗1 ), (13)
approaches δpi∗1 = 1, and (12) approaches u(2xpi∗1 ) < u(xpi∗1 ) + xpi∗1 . By strict
concavity of u, this last inequality holds. As remarked after lemma 2, x
and (1 + δpi1)x represent βw1 and βw2, respectively, so the pure-strategy
full-support steady state exists.
For the generic existence of mixed-strategy full-support steady states,
note that in the proof of proposition 1 we saw that a mixed-strategy full-
support steady state exists if a pure-strategy one does not exist. By (??) we
saw that u′(0) > 1/Jpi∗1 is necessary for the existence of a pure-strategy full-
support steady state. Therefore, if u′(0) ∈ (K, 1/Jpi∗1 ), then a mixed-strategy
full-support steady state exists.
Proof of Lemma 3. (Necessity) Suppose there is a monetary steady state
with support {0, 2}. We have pi1 = 0 and hence λ(1; 2, 0) = 0 by (15). Then
equations (16)-(17) imply that both w1 and w2 must satisfy
w =
n− 1 +m
n
βw +
1−m
n
max[u(βw), βw]. (31)
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This equation has at most two solutions: βw = 0 and βw ∈ (0, x¯). For a
monetary steady state, (31) (or (14)) must have a positive solution. This
requires u′(0) > K.
(Sufficiency) If u′(0) > K, equation (14) has a (unique) positive solution.
The rest of the proof proceeds by guess and verify. Let (pi,w, λ) satisfy the
following: (pi0, pi1, pi2) = (1 − m, 0,m), λ(1; 1, 0) = λ(1; 1, 1) = λ(1; 2, 1) =
λ(2; 2, 0) = 1, w1 = 0, and w2 is the unique positive solution to (14). We show
these form a monetary steady state with support {0, 2}. Under such λ, the
above pi satisfies (15) and w satisfies (16)-(17). By (14), u(βw2) > βw2 holds.
This and w1 = 0 ensure strict optimality of the above λ in all trade meetings
but (1, 0)-meetings. That is, we have P (2, 0) = {2}, P (1, 0) = {0, 1}, and
P (1, 1) = P (2, 1) = {1}. It is not hard to check that there is no other
monetary steady state with a non-full-support distribution.
Proof of Proposition 3. Denote the mixed-strategy steady state by
(pi,w, λ). We show that if the initial distribution pi01 is sufficienty close to pi1
and if pi1 < pi
∗
1, then the economy can jump to the steady state in one period.
By (5), the date-1 distribution is given by
pi11 = pi
0
1 −
2(pi01)
2
n
+
2
n
(
1−m− pi
0
1
2
)(
m− pi
0
1
2
)
λ0(1; 2, 0) (32)
where λ0(1; 2, 0) ∈ [0, 1] is the date-0 randomization. That is, the distribution
can jump to pi1 in one period if
pi1 ∈
[
pi01 −
2(pi01)
2
n
, pi01 −
2(pi01)
2
n
+
2
n
(
1−m− pi
0
1
2
)(
m− pi
0
1
2
)]
. (33)
The lower bound is smaller than pi1 if pi
0
1 is sufficiently close to pi1. The upper
bound can be rewritten as pi01 +ξ(pi
0
1) where ξ(pi
0
1) is positive, zero, or negative
iff pi01 < pi
∗
1, pi
0
1 = pi
∗
1 or pi
0
1 > pi
∗
1, respectively. Therefore, the upper bound of
(33) is greater than pi1 if we have pi1 < pi
∗
1 and pi
0
1 is sufficiently close to pi1.
That is, generically, there exists an open neighborhood of pi1 from which the
economy can choose λ0(1; 2, 0) to jump to pi1 in one period. Afterwards, the
economy can have (pit, wt, λt) = (pi,w, λ) for all t ≥ 1. Such randomization
is the optimal choice by the agents, because w1 = w satisfies the indifference
condition for date-0 trades. Then the initial value w0 can be determined
from the initial distribution pi01 and w
1 via the Bellman equation. (Note that
w0 does not affect agents’ decisions.) Thus the mixed-strategy steady state
is locally stable generically (i.e., if pi1 6= pi∗1).
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The proof of stability of the pure-strategy full-support steady state and
the proof of instability of the non-full-support steady state share some com-
mon procedures. The following lemma derives a dynamical system which
governs equilibrium paths, if any, that converge to these steady states.
Lemma 4 Let (pi1, w1, w2) be a steady state and let
Ψγpi = 1−
√
1 + 12m(1−m)
n
γ, (34)
φγpi =
[
−βw1−u(βw1)+2u(β∆w)
2n−βw2−[γ{u(βw1)+βw1}+(1−γ)u(βw2)]+2[u(β∆w)+βw1]
2n
]
, (35)
and
φγw =
 (n−1+pi2)βn + pi0βu′(βw1)n − pi1βu′(β∆w)n pi1βu′(β∆w)n
γpi0(u′(βw1)+1)β
n
+ pi1(1−u
′(β∆w))β
n
(n−1+pi2)β
n
+ pi0(1−γ)βu
′(βw2)
n
+ pi1βu
′(β∆w)
n
 ,
(36)
where ∆w ≡ w2 − w1 and γ ∈ {0, 1}. Suppose that φγw has an inverse. If a
sequence converges to either the pure-strategy full-support or non-full-support
steady state, then it satisfies xt+1 = F (xt), where xt ≡ (pit1, wt1, wt2), and the
Jacobian of F evaluated at the steady state is given by
Aγ ≡
[
Ψγpi O
−(φγw)−1φγpi (φγw)−1
]
, (37)
where γ = 1 for the pure-strategy full-support steady state and γ = 0 for the
non-full-support steady state.
Note that (36) is always invertible for the non-full-support steady state
(0 = γ = pi1 = w1). For the pure-strategy full-support steady state (γ = 1),
the determinant of (36) is zero iff
(n− 1 + pi2)(n− 1 + pi2 + pi0u′(βw1)) = (1− pi2)pi1u′(β∆w), (38)
where pi1 = pi
∗
1, and (w1,∆w) = (x, δx) from Lemma 2 is an implicit but well-
defined function of parameters (n,m, β, u). Equation (38) is not implied by
(11) and hence the set of parameters for which (36) is singular has measure
zero.
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Proof of Lemma 4. For the pure-strategy full-support steady state,
trading one unit in all trade meetings is a strictly preferred strategy at the
steady state (see Definition 1 and Lemma 1), so it is also optimal in its
neighborhood. That is, λt(1; 1, 0) = λt(1; 1, 1) = λt(1; 2, 1) = λt(1; 2, 0) = 1
for all t ≥ 0.
Similarly, we can also pin down the optimal trading strategy that is con-
stantly played along a path that converges to the non-full-support steady
state from pi01 6= 0, if there is any such path. By lemma 3, trading one unit
is strictly preferred in (1, 1)- and (2, 1)-meetings, and paying two units is
strictly preferred in (2, 0)-meetings at (pi,w). Therefore, they are also opti-
mal in the neighborhood of (pi,w), so λt(1; 1, 1) = λt(1; 2, 1) = λt(2; 2, 0) = 1
for all t ≥ 0. Moreover, the following argument shows λt(1; 1, 0) = 1 should
be the case for all t ≥ 0. When the economy is close to but not equal to
(pi,w), we have pit1 > 0 for all t ≥ 0 so (6) implies wt1 > 0 for all t > 0, because
there is always a positive probability that a consumer with one unit meets a
producer with one unit and the consumer can get a positive amount of util-
ity from such a meeting.7 Moreover, (14) implies u(x) > x for all x < βw2
and therefore u(βwt1) > βw
t
1 holds all along the path. So, in (1, 0)-meetings,
paying one unit is strictly preferred to paying nothing along the path.
Therefore in both cases, a unique strategy is constantly played along
any potential convergent path. Under that strategy, the law of motion and
Bellman equation reduces to
pit+11 = pi
t
1 −
2(pit1)
2
n
+
2
n
(
1−m− pi
t
1
2
)(
m− pi
t
1
2
)
γ (39)
wt1 =
n− 1 + pit2
n
βwt+11 +
pit0
n
u(βwt+11 ) +
pit1
n
u(βwt+12 − βwt+11 ) (40)
wt2 =
n− 1 + pit2
n
βwt+12 +
pit0
n
[γ(u(βwt+11 ) + βw
t+1
1 ) + (1− γ)u(βwt+12 )]
+
pit1
n
[u(βwt+12 − βwt+11 ) + βwt+11 ], (41)
where γ = 1 for the pure-strategy full-support steady state and γ = 0 for
the non-full-support steady state. Denote (39) by pit+11 = Ψ
γ(pit1) : Π → Π
and (40)-(41) by wt = φγ(pit1, w
t+1) : Π×W → W , where wt ≡ (wt1, wt2) and
7One can consider the dynamic version of (16) with pit1 > 0 and w
t+1
2 > 0.
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W ≡ {(w1, w2)|0 ≤ w1 ≤ w2}. Then, our dynamical system is(
pit+11
wt+1
)
=
(
Ψγ(pit1)
Φγ(pit1, w
t)
)
, (42)
where Φγ is the inverse of φγ (inverse in terms of w) and is obtained by
applying the implicit function theorem in the vicinity of the steady state.8
This is F in the statement of this lemma.
Finally, straightforward differentiation of (39)-(41) and the implicit func-
tion theorem imply that the Jacobian of F at the steady state is given by
(34)-(37).
The proofs of propositions 4 and 5 look into the properties of (37).
Proof of Propositions 4. For the pure-strategy full-support steady state,
we set γ = 1 in (37) and denote the steady state by (pi∗, w∗). Because the
top-right submatrix of (37) is a zero matrix, one eigenvalue of (37) is given
by (34), which is smaller than one, and the other two eigenvalues are those
of (φγw)
−1, which are the reciprocals of eigenvalues of φγw. In what follows, we
show that eigenvalues of φγw are smaller than one in absolute value.
Because h1(βw
∗
1, pi
∗
1) < 1, we have
n(1− β) + (1− pi∗2)β
β
> pi∗0u
′(βw∗1) + pi
∗
1
(1− pi∗2)β
n(1− β) + (1− pi∗2)β
u′(β∆w∗).
(43)
The eigenvalues of a general 2× 2 matrix
[
a b
c d
]
are given by
η+, η− =
a+ d±√(a− d)2 + 4bc
2
.
8Because the non-full-support steady state lies on the boundary of Π×W , the domain
of Ψγ , φγ and hence the domain of u are extended to allow for an open neighborhood
around the steady state before applying the implicit function theorem. This is the only
place where the assumption u′(0) <∞ is used.
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Because
(a− d)2 + 4bc
=
[
pi∗0
n
βu′(βw∗1)− 2
pi∗1
n
βu′(β∆w∗)
]2
+4
[
1− pi∗2
n
β +
pi∗0
n
βu′(βw∗1)−
pi∗1
n
βu′(β∆w∗)
]
pi∗1
n
βu′(β∆w∗)
=
[
pi∗0
n
βu′(βw∗1)
]2
+ 4
1− pi∗2
n
β
pi∗1
n
βu′(β∆w∗) > 0,
both eigenvalues are real. They are smaller than one in absolute value if and
only if a+ d < 2 and (1− a)(1− d)− bc > 0. Checking these conditions for
(36) gives
1− a+ 1− d
= 2
(
1− n− 1 + pi
∗
2
n
β
)
− pi
∗
0
n
βu′(βw∗1)
> 2
n(1− β) + (1− pi∗2)β
n
− pi
∗
0
n
βu′(βw∗1)−
pi∗1
n
(1− pi∗2)β
n(1− β) + (1− pi∗2)β
βu′ (β∆w∗)
>
n(1− β) + (1− pi∗2)β
n
> 0; and
(1− a)(1− d)− bc
=
(
1− n− 1 + pi
∗
2
n
β − pi
∗
0
n
βu′(βw∗1) +
pi∗1
n
βu′(β∆w∗)
)(
1− n− 1 + pi
∗
2
n
β − pi
∗
1
n
βu′(β∆w∗)
)
−pi
∗
1
n
βu′(β∆w∗)
[
1− pi∗2
n
β +
pi∗0
n
βu′(βw∗1)−
pi∗1
n
βu′(β∆w∗)
]
=
(n(1− β) + (1− pi∗2)β)β
n2
×(
n(1− β) + (1− pi∗2)β
β
− pi∗0u′(βw∗1)− pi∗1
(1− pi∗2)β
n(1− β) + (1− pi∗2)β
u′(β∆w∗)
)
> 0,
where the last inequalities of the above two conditions follow from (43).
Therefore, the eigenvalues of (φγw)
−1 are greater than one in absolute value.
The pure-strategy full-support steady state has a one-dimensional stable
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manifold. Because we have one initial condition, this full-support steady
state is locally stable and determinate.
Proof of Propositions 5. To establish the instability of the non-full-
support steady state, suppose by way of contradiction that there is an equi-
librium path that converges to that steady state. By assumption, the econ-
omy starts with pi01 > 0, which in turn means w
0
1 > 0 as was shown in the
proof of lemma 4. By lemma 4, such a path must have Jacobian (37) with
γ = 0. We analize the local trajectory implied by the eigenvectors.
Equation (34) gives a unit eigenvalue for the law of motion. The unit
Figure 2: Unit-root convergence of the law of motion
root does not immediately imply instability: As figure 2 illustrates, the law
of motion (39) has slope at the fixed point that is unity, but it still displays
convergence. Note also that this steady state is on the boundary of the
state space Π×W , which makes it necessary to explictly study the limiting
behavior by seeing the eigenspace of the linearized system (37) to check
(pit1, w
t) ∈ Π×W all along the path.9
As 0 = γ = pi1 = w1, the Jacobian (37) reduces to
Aγ =
 1 0 0−r/a′ 1/a′ 0
−s/d′ 0 1/d′
 , (44)
where r ≡ 1
n
u(βw2), s ≡ 12n [u(βw2)− βw2] > 0, a′ ≡ (n−1+m)βn + 1−mn βu
′
(0),
and d′ ≡ (n−1+m)β
n
+ 1−m
n
u
′
(βw2)β. Note that because w2 is a positive solution
to (14), a′ > 1 and d′ ∈ (0, 1) hold. Eigenvalues of (44) are simply its diagonal
elements.
Since pi01 > 0, w
0
1 > 0, and the law of motion has unit-root convergence,
the convergent trajectory will eventually be parallel to the eigenspace of (44)
associated with the unit eigenvalue10. The associated eigenvector, which
9Note that this analysis is not needed for the pure-strategy full-support steady state
because that steady state is in the interior of Π×W .
10See Subsection “Dominant Eigenvector” on page 165 of [4].
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constitutes a base of the space, has the form 1−r
a′−1
s
1−d′
 .
The fact that convergent trajectory of (pit1, w
t
1, w
t
2 − w2) will be parallel to
the above eigenvector implies that pit1 and w
t
1 will eventually have different
signs, in contradiction to pit1, w
t
1 > 0 for all t.
6 Concluding remarks
We show that the necessary and sufficient condition for existence of the mon-
etary steady state of the Trejos-Wright {0, 1} economy, namely (8), is also
necessary and sufficient for existence of a full-support steady state of the
{0, 1, 2} economy. Hence, Zhu’s (2003) sufficient condition is not necessary
for the bound of two. Moreover, both the pure-strategy and mixed-strategy
full-support steady states are generic. Given our result, a reasonable conjec-
ture would be that even for a higher bound, the condition (8) is necessary
and sufficient for the existence of full-support steady states. For values of
parameters that lead to lower values of money (i.e., high n, low β and high
m), randomization may occur.
The sharp contrast we find in our stability analysis, namely the local sta-
bility of full-support steady states and instability of non-full-support steady
states, also permits conjectures for the case of general bound.11 Generalizing
Proposition 4-5 to a higher bound case, however, is not simple. When the
bound is two, we can identify candidate strategies that support steady states
and get explicit expressions for the relevant difference-equation system. For
a general bound, we do not know the supporting strategies. Therefore, if
analogous proofs are to be provided, they must be constructed differently.12
11In this respect, our result is consistent with the equilibrium refinement studied by
Wallace and Zhu (2004), who show that a preference perturbation by means of commodity
money rules out the non-full-support steady states while the full-support steady state
survives such a refinement. The multiplicity of steady states bears some resemblance to
that in Green-Zhou (2002). However, the models are very different, as are the stability
results.
12In our companion paper, we generalize the result concerning instability of non-full-
support steady states (Proposition 5) to a general bound case. See Huang and Igarashi
(2013).
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